Courts—Injunction Against Use of Air by Radio by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 2 
January 1927 
Courts—Injunction Against Use of Air by Radio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Courts—Injunction Against Use of Air by Radio, 12 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 151 (1927). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss2/13 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COURTS-INJUNcTIoN AGAINST USE OF AIR BY RADio.-There was an agreement
between the State Marketing Commissioner who operates Radio Broadcasting
Station W 0 S, and plaintiff who operates Radio Broadcasting Station K L D S
on same wave length, to have a division of hours for broadcasting so as not to
interfere with each other, which was broken by the defendant. Suit in equity to
enjoin defendant from further interfering. Held, that federal courts have juris-
diction, and that the observance of a condition in a radio license is enforceable
by injunction. Carmichael v. Anderson, 14 Fed. (2d) 166.
This decision brings up the very interesting question of who has a right to the
use of the air. In cases where the broadcasting station has power to transmit
messages from one state to another, the federal courts have jurisdiction as to
agreements to broadcast, and licenses, under U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 10100. And
while the Secretary of Commerce, by U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 10101, may grant
licenses only in accordance with the provisions of the legislative act, still he may
issue licenses with restrictions which the parties interested may agree upon.
Carmichael v. Anderson, supra. 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 100 states, "The transmission
of messages by wireless telegraphy is commerce, and the power of the United
States to regulate commerce and to preserve the territorial integrity of this
country does not depend upon the means employed, but the end attained." This
clearly indicates an intention to make some stand toward regulating the use of
the air so that there will be no undue congestion.
This proposition as to the right of way of the air has been very little litigated.
The only questions which the courts have so far decided are those having to
do with copyright infringements, Remick v. Automobile Accessories Co., 5 Fed.
(2d) 411; Witmark v. Bamberger Co., 291 Fed. 776; and those having to do
with municipally owned stations, Fletcher v. Hylan, 211 N. Y. S. 397, deciding
that municipal corporations may own broadcasting stations. C. H. L. '28.
DAMAGES-INTEREsT-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN GENERAL-DEMIANDS NOT
LIQUIDATED -Plaintiff, Olson, was employed by defendants to procure coal leases
for them and as a result of his efforts, defendants were able to secure leases
on about 6,000 acres of land and paid plaintiff $7,000, this amount to apply on
the cost of his services. There being no express contract for compensation,
this suit is one on a quantum meruit to recover the claimed balance due for
said services. Held, that in an action for services rendered, plaintiff is entitled
to interest from the time of completion of services on the amount found to be
due him, although such amount was previously in dispute. Olson v. Shuler et al.,
(Iowa 1926) 210 N. W. 453.
An unliquidated claim with reference to the allowance of interest, has been
defined as one which is undetermined as to certainty of amount. At common
law, the rule was that interest was not recoverable upon unliquidated demands
but was allowable only after such demands shall have become merged in a
judgment, Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Emerman, 191 Ill. App. 530. The reason,
of course, was that the defendant did not know what sum was due and hence
could not discharge his debt, until the amount of same was rendered certain,
as by a judgment, Lowell v. Shortbill, 103 Kan. 904, 176 P. 647. This rule has
been modified by modern decisions so that interest is allowed even in the case
of unliquidated demands when the amount is readily ascertainable by mere
computation or by reference to existing, well established market values, Cox v.
McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 18 P. 100; or when the failure to determine on a fixed
amount was through the defendant's fault, McMahon v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co., 20
N. Y. 463. This rule as modified has found frequent application in cases of
unliquidated demands for service rendered, Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 18
P. 100. In some jurisdictions, interest is allowed from the date of the writ
starting the proceedings, Brewer v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 12 Pick. (Mass.)
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